It is
entirely possible that by the time this appears on the web the BJP would have
sealed an alliance either with the PDP or the NC in Jammu and Kashmir. There
are indications that this time the party would like to make a serious bid for
power in the state. There is nothing exceptionable in that. Political parties
contest elections to come to power.
Some of
the party’s supporters in the social media and opinion-piece writers in online
portals would like it ‘not to let go’ of the opportunity.
But every opportunity has a cost. In economic theory this is called the opportunity cost. If the party
has achieved a majority or was able to form a government with a ‘near
majority’, the opportunity cost would have been payable at the end of
the term based on its performance in office during the intervening period,
which in the case of Jammu and Kashmir is six years.
The opportunity cost that a political party pays for
immediate gains can have far reaching consequences, not all of them economic
and not just for the party. The polity of the state and the nation, as stake
holders will pay a cost too. The cost could be in terms of stalled development,
internal disturbances or external threats. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had
paid costs on all these accounts in the last sixty seven years. This was in
addition to the cost that was paid in advance, a cost that was not payable and
not even demanded. The additional cost paid in advance was the referral to the
United Nations and Article 370 which excluded the state from the national
mainstream. There is no need to go into Jawaharlal Nehru’s reasons or
motivations on why he paid the two additional costs that were not even
demanded, but they, it turns out are not one-time costs.
Opportunity
cost relates
to the cost one has to pay not only for availing an opportunity but also for
foregoing an opportunity. Unfortunately the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the
nation paid opportunity costs twice more in 1965 and 1971 for foregoing opportunities.
The
‘pro-power’ BJP supporters argue that this time around the BJP has achieved a
quite impressive tally of 25 seats in the 87 member assembly and more
importantly the largest vote share. The inherent anomaly in the
first-past-the-post electoral system made political parties win fewer seats
with larger vote percentages in the past too. It has to do with the
concentration of winning seats in a region of the state. It has happened this
time too with the BJP winning more seats in the Jammu region and may be losing
some seats in the Srinagar Valley with slender margins.
The
‘pro-power’ BJP supporters’ argument runs like this: ‘if in an alternative
scenario the non-BJP parties, the NC and the PDP were to come together to form
the government, it would be un-representative of the Jammu region. Therefore the BJP
should seek to be part of the power-centre, no matter what the cost.’
There
were many instances in the past when governments at the centre and states were
formed by parties which had no representation in several states or regions. For
example in 1977 when the Janata Party came to power at the centre the Congress
won 41 out of 42 seats in Andhra Pradesh and 26 out of 28 in Karnataka. In a
further twist when Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, the lone Janata Party MP in Andhra
Pradesh was elected President even that seat went to the Congress. Closer in
time, the present BJP government is in power with its party unrepresented in
Kerala, has just one MP in Tamil Nadu and two in Bengal.
The
second argument that is advanced is that letting go the opportunity now might result in losing ground to
the other party which could utilize the opportunity to consolidate its political position. There were quite a
few instances in the past when parties with ‘near majority’ adopted short cut
methods to come to power by what the mainstream media would like to call
‘cobbling’ majorities. As a result of this, unstable regimes came to power in
the past in states like Goa, Jharkand and Manipur but seldom saw out their full
term in office.
BJP’s
earlier experiences in Goa, Jharkand and Karnataka were none too comforting. By
compromising on its core values for aligning with the Janata Dal (S) it not
only wasted years in Karnataka but lost so much ground politically that it
might be some time before it can even look at power in the state again. The
argument that spurred the BJP then was that it was the first time the party
would come to power in the South.
It is similar to the one put forth now that it would gain foothold in the
Muslim majority state of J & K, another first for BJP. Just as the
perception of an unholy alliance between Congress and RJD in Bihar benefited
the BJP, JD (U) alliance in 2006, the perception of an unholy alliance between
the BJP and JD (S), the wrangling for the Chief Minister’s post by rotation and
the even un-holier ‘fabricated majority’ with which Yeddyurappa ruled the state
benefited the Congress in 2013.
What
ideological compromises will the BJP have to make for a stab at power in J
& K? The better option is to align with the National Conference and
independents in which case the BJP, being the larger partner, would get the
Chief Minister’s post. According to a report in Eenaadu, the quid pro quo being
worked out between the BJP and the NC is the post of a Governor for Farooq Abdullah and a berth in the
union cabinet for Omar Abdhullah through the Rajya Sabha route. Farooq of
course would love the sinecure with all its pomp and ceremony sans
responsibility. But the Hindus of J & K have painful memories of his reign
when as the Chief Minister he abdicated responsibility and left them to the
tender mercies of foreign and home-grown terrorists like Ali Shah Jelani and
Yasin Malik. The half-a-million Hindus exiled then are still out in the cold.
The
second option is to align with the PDP in which case it will have to settle to
play second fiddle, perhaps for the post of a Deputy Chief Minister. As a
precondition the PDP is demanding that the BJP should unambiguously declare
that it would give up its stand on Article 370 forever and rescind the Armed
Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).
Agreeing
to make Article 370 a permanent feature of the Constitution will foreclose any option a future
central government may have of a rethink on it. This is similar to Jawaharlal
Nehru’s folly of recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in
1954. No Indian government can retract it.
Any
move to rescind the AFSPA is fraught with serious practical consequences. The
state has been the victim of terrorism exported by an enemy which vowed to
bleed India through a thousand cuts. The unfortunate aspect is the terror
machine has local support too.
Lastly
the political ideology of the PDP is worrisome. It is a soft-line version of
the more militant hard-line Hurriyat Conference. By aligning with such a party
would not the BJP provide some legitimacy to it?
Would
it not be therefore advisable for the BJP to sit out in the opposition; let the
contradictions of the NC, PDP alliance play out and make a bid for power in
2020? The alliance is not likely to last the full term except in the highly
unlikely event of the two merging. In the meantime it can play the role of a
constructive opposition and keep the ruling clique in check.