Showing posts with label Jammu and Kashmir. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jammu and Kashmir. Show all posts

Monday, June 04, 2018

Patel Reversed Junagadh’s Accession To Pakistan And Reintegrated In India

Did you know that Prabhas Patan, where the famous Somnath temple is located would have been in Pakistan had not Sardar Patel acted with dispatch and decisiveness in October-November 1947? Thanks to the history doctored by omission and commission by the left-illiberal historians few people in India today know the story of Junagadh. As everyone knows, the British gave 565 princely states the option to join India or Pakistan in August 1947. Of these two could not have joined India because of their geographical location.

A third, Kalat which constitutes a major part of Balochistan wanted to join India but Nehru’s political myopia prevented that. Jinnah moved swiftly to annex the mineral-rich State. Jammu and Kashmir was not the only state which Pakistan sought to occupy by force. Whereas Pakistan could only partially succeed in its designs on J & K, it fully occupied Kalat. Thus Pakistan which was founded based on religion had a violent streak in its national psyche since its inception although peace lowers on the Indian side delude themselves that the leopard would someday shed its spots.

Some would argue that agreeing to the accession of Kalat to India would have attenuated the arguments for the integration of Hyderabad in India. However, Pakistan advanced the same arguments to annex Junagadh as India could for the accession of Kalat but did not, and did for the accession of Jammu and Kashmir but still lost a third of its territory.     

Of the remaining princely states Sardar Patel seamlessly integrated 560 states into the Indian Union, including a recalcitrant Hyderabad. Nehru who handled Jammu and Kashmir made a dog’s breakfast of it. There was another state, Junagadh which while pretending to join India secretly planned and joined Pakistan on August 15, 1947. Read why its accession would have been disastrous for India and how Sardar Patel reversed its accession to Pakistan and brought it back into India’s fold.

The princely state of Junagadh is at the south-western corner of the Saurashtra peninsula of modern Gujarat. It was an important state of what was known as the Kathiawar group of states in pre-independence India. Junagadh was deep inside and surrounded on three sides by India and on the south and southwest by the Arabian Sea. It has no overland route to Pakistan. The distance between the nearest ports Veraval (Junagadh) and Karachi (Sind, Pakistan) is about 300 miles. Another complicating geographical factor about the state is that throughout its borders either its territories jutted into neighbouring states like fingers or their territories jutted into it. Spread over 3,337 square miles, it had a population of 6.71 lakh according to 1941 census of which 80% were Hindus. Its famous Jain and Hindu temples including the famous Somnath temple attracted pilgrims from all over India.

While giving the impression that the state would accede to India, Junagadh secretly negotiated and on August 15, 1947 declared its accession to Pakistan. This was not acceptable to India for strategic reasons and the possible cascading effect it would have on the delicate negotiations with Hyderabad that were under way. On Pakistan’s right to accept Junagadh’s accession to it, Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan informed Nehru that ‘a ruler had the absolute right to accede without reference to the moral or ethnic aspects of accession’.

In a discussion with Jinnah, Mountbatten read out the full statement of the Pakistan Prime Minister as reported by the Statesman of September 21, 1947:

The correct position is that the Indian Independence Act of 1947 has left all Indian States completely free to join either one Dominion or the other or to enter into treaty relations with either. Legally and constitutionally there can be no question of putting limitations on this right of the States. Muslim League leaders before 15 August and the official spokesman of the Pakistan Government thereafter have publicly declared their agreement with this view; and have since rigorously stood by it. No objection has been raised by Pakistan to any State acceding to the Dominion of India.” (Italics added.) [1]

This was exactly India’s case regarding Jammu and Kashmir then and all along. Jinnah agreed that it was the legal position. Thus there appears to be unanimity on the subject of accession of Princely States in both India and Pakistan. Despite this, Mountbatten suggested that the matter of Junagadh and later, Hyderabad, and Jammu and Kashmir should be referred to the United Nations Organisation. In the case of Junagadh, Sardar Patel vetoed the proposal saying that there was grave danger in being a plaintiff before the UNO. As we will see later, the decision was taken out of Patel’s hands in the case of Jammu and Kashmir with disastrous consequences.

After futile negotiations with the eccentric Nawab of Junagadh and Pakistan, the cabinet decided to move a brigade of the Indian army to the Kathiawar states surrounding Junagadh which have already acceded to India for their protection and to assist their forces. It was designated as the ‘Kathiawar Defence Force’ (KDF).

The landlocked Junagadh state was dependent on the surrounding Kathiawar states for its economy and food grains. But as Junagadh now joined enemy Pakistan, in view of the uncertain political conditions, traders in the adjoining states refused to do business with it, resulting in a virtual economic blockade. There was utter chaos and a hundred thousand Hindus fled from the state. Realising the situation was going out of control, the Nawab took flight to Pakistan taking with him the entire State treasury.

One of the factors that precipitated the crisis was the peculiar situation of two tiny states, the principality of Babariawad and the Sheikdom of Mangrol in relation to Junagadh. In the pre-independence period Junagadh had jurisdiction over Babariawad and a portion of Mangrol. The two tiny states declared independence as soon as the British Paramountcy ended and signed instruments of accession with India. An angered Junagadh sent its troops to occupy Babariawad and Mangrol. India considered this an act of aggression and was forced to move its forces to liberate Babariawad and Mangrol. Mountbatten was informed of the move only after the army was already on the march. It was a move that pre-empted him.

In the meantime, the Kathiawar Congress leaders formed a provisional government (Arzi Hukumat) with Samaldas Gandhi as its President and with its headquarters at Rajkot. After the Nawab’s flight, the forces of Arzi Hukumat began dispersing into various parts of Junagadh. Sir Shah Nawaz, the Dewan of Junagadh opened negotiations with Samaldas Gandhi requesting him to take over the administration and restore law and order in the state. Despite protestations from Pakistan, the state’s request to accede to India was accepted. When Sardar Patel visited Junagadh on November 13 he received a rousing reception. As per earlier promise India conducted a referendum in Junagadh on February 20, 1948. Of the 2,01,457 registered voters 1,90,870 exercised their franchise and all except 91 voted in favour of the state’s accession to India. In a similar referendum conducted in Mangrol and Manavadar, Babariawad, Bantwa and Sardargarh, of the 31, 439 votes cast, only 39 favoured Pakistan. A year later on February 20, 1949 all these states were finally and fully integrated with the Indian Union.



[1] Krishna, Balraj. (2007). India’s Bismarck Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. India Source Books. New Delhi. p. 205.

Excerpted from ‘TWISTING FACTS TO SUIT THEORIES’ AND OTHER SELECTIONS FROM VOXINDICA pp. 306-309


Monday, December 29, 2014

BJP: Opportunity cost of pawning political ideology in J & K

It is entirely possible that by the time this appears on the web the BJP would have sealed an alliance either with the PDP or the NC in Jammu and Kashmir. There are indications that this time the party would like to make a serious bid for power in the state. There is nothing exceptionable in that. Political parties contest elections to come to power.

Some of the party’s supporters in the social media and opinion-piece writers in online portals would like it ‘not to let go’ of the opportunity. But every opportunity has a cost. In economic theory this is called the opportunity cost. If the party has achieved a majority or was able to form a government with a ‘near majority’, the opportunity cost would have been payable at the end of the term based on its performance in office during the intervening period, which in the case of Jammu and Kashmir is six years.

The opportunity cost that a political party pays for immediate gains can have far reaching consequences, not all of them economic and not just for the party. The polity of the state and the nation, as stake holders will pay a cost too. The cost could be in terms of stalled development, internal disturbances or external threats. The state of Jammu and Kashmir had paid costs on all these accounts in the last sixty seven years. This was in addition to the cost that was paid in advance, a cost that was not payable and not even demanded. The additional cost paid in advance was the referral to the United Nations and Article 370 which excluded the state from the national mainstream. There is no need to go into Jawaharlal Nehru’s reasons or motivations on why he paid the two additional costs that were not even demanded, but they, it turns out are not one-time costs.

Opportunity cost relates to the cost one has to pay not only for availing an opportunity but also for foregoing an opportunity. Unfortunately the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the nation paid opportunity costs twice more in 1965 and 1971 for foregoing opportunities.

The ‘pro-power’ BJP supporters argue that this time around the BJP has achieved a quite impressive tally of 25 seats in the 87 member assembly and more importantly the largest vote share. The inherent anomaly in the first-past-the-post electoral system made political parties win fewer seats with larger vote percentages in the past too. It has to do with the concentration of winning seats in a region of the state. It has happened this time too with the BJP winning more seats in the Jammu region and may be losing some seats in the Srinagar Valley with slender margins.

The ‘pro-power’ BJP supporters’ argument runs like this: ‘if in an alternative scenario the non-BJP parties, the NC and the PDP were to come together to form the government, it would be un-representative of the Jammu region. Therefore the BJP should seek to be part of the power-centre, no matter what the cost.’

There were many instances in the past when governments at the centre and states were formed by parties which had no representation in several states or regions. For example in 1977 when the Janata Party came to power at the centre the Congress won 41 out of 42 seats in Andhra Pradesh and 26 out of 28 in Karnataka. In a further twist when Neelam Sanjeeva Reddy, the lone Janata Party MP in Andhra Pradesh was elected President even that seat went to the Congress. Closer in time, the present BJP government is in power with its party unrepresented in Kerala, has just one MP in Tamil Nadu and two in Bengal.

The second argument that is advanced is that letting go the opportunity now might result in losing ground to the other party which could utilize the opportunity to consolidate its political position. There were quite a few instances in the past when parties with ‘near majority’ adopted short cut methods to come to power by what the mainstream media would like to call ‘cobbling’ majorities. As a result of this, unstable regimes came to power in the past in states like Goa, Jharkand and Manipur but seldom saw out their full term in office.

BJP’s earlier experiences in Goa, Jharkand and Karnataka were none too comforting. By compromising on its core values for aligning with the Janata Dal (S) it not only wasted years in Karnataka but lost so much ground politically that it might be some time before it can even look at power in the state again. The argument that spurred the BJP then was that it was the first time the party would come to power in the South. It is similar to the one put forth now that it would gain foothold in the Muslim majority state of J & K, another first for BJP. Just as the perception of an unholy alliance between Congress and RJD in Bihar benefited the BJP, JD (U) alliance in 2006, the perception of an unholy alliance between the BJP and JD (S), the wrangling for the Chief Minister’s post by rotation and the even un-holier ‘fabricated majority’ with which Yeddyurappa ruled the state benefited the Congress in 2013.

What ideological compromises will the BJP have to make for a stab at power in J & K? The better option is to align with the National Conference and independents in which case the BJP, being the larger partner, would get the Chief Minister’s post. According to a report in Eenaadu, the quid pro quo being worked out between the BJP and the NC is the post of a Governor for Farooq Abdullah and a berth in the union cabinet for Omar Abdhullah through the Rajya Sabha route. Farooq of course would love the sinecure with all its pomp and ceremony sans responsibility. But the Hindus of J & K have painful memories of his reign when as the Chief Minister he abdicated responsibility and left them to the tender mercies of foreign and home-grown terrorists like Ali Shah Jelani and Yasin Malik. The half-a-million Hindus exiled then are still out in the cold.

The second option is to align with the PDP in which case it will have to settle to play second fiddle, perhaps for the post of a Deputy Chief Minister. As a precondition the PDP is demanding that the BJP should unambiguously declare that it would give up its stand on Article 370 forever and rescind the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA).

Agreeing to make Article 370 a permanent feature of the Constitution will foreclose any option a future central government may have of a rethink on it. This is similar to Jawaharlal Nehru’s folly of recognizing Chinese sovereignty over Tibet in 1954. No Indian government can retract it.   

Any move to rescind the AFSPA is fraught with serious practical consequences. The state has been the victim of terrorism exported by an enemy which vowed to bleed India through a thousand cuts. The unfortunate aspect is the terror machine has local support too.

Lastly the political ideology of the PDP is worrisome. It is a soft-line version of the more militant hard-line Hurriyat Conference. By aligning with such a party would not the BJP provide some legitimacy to it?

Would it not be therefore advisable for the BJP to sit out in the opposition; let the contradictions of the NC, PDP alliance play out and make a bid for power in 2020? The alliance is not likely to last the full term except in the highly unlikely event of the two merging. In the meantime it can play the role of a constructive opposition and keep the ruling clique in check.